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Abstract
Internal and external pressures are constantly stimulating adaptation of core
characteristics and norms of democratic government. In this paper, drawing
on the Irish experience, we wish to consider how systems of democratic
accountability have responded to fragmentation of government caused by
domestic and international demands. In order to further our analysis, we
reconfigure the drivers of such demands into bottom-up, horizontal and top-
down processes and consider how they are matched by new accountability
structures which also have diverse origins. We find that new modes of
accountability are diverse, expanding in scope, and of mixed intensity of
application. In conclusion, we argue that the fragmentation of accountability
structures deserves greater recognition and a degree of re-casting of
accountability narratives and policies.2
1. Introduction – the classical model of democratic government and its
accountability
Within the classical formulation of democratic government, the business of the
state is to deliver policy and services. Democratic governance structures have
evolved in various directions to offer different models for linking the
aspirations and values of citizens to the choice and functioning of elected
politicians, the bureaucracies which support them and the processes through
which decisions are made and decision-makers held accountable (Lijphart
1999) .The concentration of power which is common to most such democratic
governance systems is accompanied by means of ensuring both ex ante and
ex post oversight.
Another feature of classical government is that it is traditionally understood as
a hierarchical relationship i.e. that government consists of a set of superior-
subordinate relationships. However, at particular points in this hierarchy, a
certain amount of co-ordination is necessary. In parliamentary democracies,
the doctrine of ministerial responsibility provides a key mechanism of co-
ordination. This doctrine provides that each cabinet minister is responsible to
the parliament for all activities within his or her ministry (and related
agencies). This provides a form of vertical co-ordination. Through a second
key doctrine – collective responsibility - ministers, through their participation in
cabinet are responsible for shaping the government’s general policy. This
provides a means of horizontal coordination.
The means of ensuring governments, as agents, acted in the interests of their
principals has involved the use of a number of core forms of accountability.
From the late nineteenth century, such oversight centred on mechanisms of
financial and political accountability. In the case of the former, audit of the
system of public administration became a central duty of government and was
institutionally linked to the latter form of oversight. Political accountability was
institutionalised by allowing for parliamentary scrutiny of the executive, and in
many systems was later intensified through the establishment or development
of parliamentary committees with responsibility for scrutiny over particular3
areas of government policy. In many jurisdictions, the mechanism of financial
accountability was directly linked to parliament (rather than government) and
included Courts of Auditors and Auditors-General who reported to parliament.
Audit functions received new emphasis in widespread new public
management reforms which have seen them extent to scrutinising value for
money and beyond (Scott 2003). During the twentieth century, the latent
juridical accountability of the state expanded in many jurisdictions, ranging
between quite limited judicial review of administrative action (for example in
the UK and New Zealand) to more extensive constitutional review (for
example in Germany and the United States). Narratives supporting the
legitimacy of government actions focused not only democratic mandates, but
also on assumptions that there were in place robust mechanisms of financial,
political and judicial accountability.
2. The fragmentation of government
As has been well-documented, traditional conceptualisations of government
such as that presented above no longer adequately explain the nature of
modern governance (Rhodes 1996, Pierre and Peters 2000). A variety of
interpretations have been developed to capture the myriad of state-society-
market interactions and relationships that have emerged since the 1970s,
driven in part by processes of internationalization and neo-liberal
governmental agendas (Rhodes 1997, Kooiman 2003). Thus, we can
understand contemporary democratic government as ‘fragmented’ at a
number of levels which has contributed to greater complexity and challenged
traditional notions of accountability. While there is also considerable evidence
of fragmentation at the local level (cf. John 2001), we focus here on the
national level.
Government fragmentation has occurred due to devolution, decentralisation,
outsourcing, privatisation and delegation of functions (Pollitt and Talbot 2004,
Verhoest et al. 2007). These changes can be attributed to a number of
sources including bureaucratic reform in search of greater efficiency, EU and4
international developments, and changing ideas, in particular about state-
society relationships and the relative merits of hierarchical over networked
governance.
Bureaucratic reform
Seeking to improve efficiency in public spending, enhance service quality and
performance, and achieve more effective use of public resources, many
developed states have undertaken wide-ranging programmes of public sector
reform within the last three decades. In some cases, the reforms have sought
to achieve more political control of the bureaucracy and to introduce new
forms of accountability, usually directly to the public and supported by such
innovations as Freedom of Information legislation and e-government
initiatives. As Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004: 6-7) suggest, not all of the goals
sought, including greater trust in government and improved performance and
service quality, have been achieved. Indeed, reforms based on the market-
inspired New Public Management agenda have been identified as a source of
increased institutional fragmentation within bureaucracies. Pierre (2009)
argues that much of recent bureaucratic reform has tended to view traditional
political institutions as barriers to increased efficiency and performance. In
response to difficulties in co-ordinating increasingly diffuse bureaucracies, a
more recent wave of reforms has sought to overcoming traditional and new
institutional boundaries by ‘joining-up’ fragmented governments.
While problems of co-ordination and specialisation are as old as bureaucracy
itself, what is distinctive about recent bureaucratic reform within the OECD is
the disconnection of different stages in the policy process i.e. policy design,
implementation and evaluation (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). This
disaggregation has manifested itself in the emergence of a multitude of
different kinds of semi-autonomous organizations or agencies (OECD 2002,
Pollitt and Talbot 2004) – a process referred to as ‘agencification’.
Agencification has necessitated considerable innovation and redesign in
accountability mechanisms, with a particular focus on ex post result
performance rather than ex ante input measurement. Processes of de-5
agencification are also embarked on by governments in response to
difficulties of management and a perceived lack of accountability.
EU
It has become a truism to say that the demands of EU membership have
challenged the governments of its member-states, but availing of the
opportunities presented by deepening integration has required adherence to
new modes of governing and accountability requirements, particular in respect
of audit. Considerable attention has been given to the challenges faced by
national legislatures within the Union as they strive to find their place within
the complex architecture of national and transnational institutions (cf.
O’Brennan and Raunio 2007). Multi-level governance, though a difficult
analytical tool, is used to capture the complex inter-relationships between
local, regional, national and EU levels of government. Membership of the
Union has also resulted in considerable institutional isomorphism – with
member-states adopting modes of governance and public management
based on the experience of their peers. While the Union emphasises its
reluctance to being overly-specific about the manner in which member-states
engage in transposition of EU law, regulation of standards and the
implementation of tasks, it unquestionable plays a role in establishing norms
and the allocation of values.
International
As well as understanding domestic political-administrative culture and the
consequences of EU memberhip, shifts in the mode of the state’s response to
new policy needs must also be understood with reference to the ideas
available to policy makers from wider international discourse. Outside of the
EU, international organisations such as the OECD, the IMF, and the World
Bank adopt normative stances about the conditions under which nation-states
should manage their affairs. Interestingly, despite the expectation of
convergence in policy style between states as a result of these strong
international pressures, there remains considerable difference in the modes of6
governance employed (Weiss 1998; Thatcher 2007). Nonetheless, the recent
international credit crisis has also provided new insights into the influence
held by international credit rating institutions, whose determinations on the
economic future of individual nations has had a direct consequence on those
states’ economic survival, as well as the survival of their incumbent
governments.
Regulation
The growth of the regulatory state has been well documented also (Jordana
and Levi-Faur 2004, Doern and Johnson 2006, Gilardi 2008). In essence, the
opening up of the state to market-driven change has for many re-cast the role
of the state from rowing towards steering (Moran 2002). In this, it is related to
the phenomenon of agencification, as states increasingly vest their regulatory
functions in quasi-autonomous bodies (Christensen and Laegrid 2006) and
seek to exert arms-length regulatory oversight even over other parts of the
public sector (Hood, 2004). Regulatory environments have become complex
(not only to the ordinary citizen but to the regulated also), and involve multi-
level and multi-actor interaction, often in multi-sector settings. The EU has
played a role in creating a vertical fragmentation of regulatory responsibilities
between it and member-states.
Networks and changing state-society relations
One of the defining characteristics of modern governing has been the blurring
of lines between state and society and the emergence of ‘networks’ as the
drivers of activity. Network governance emerged as a response to the belief
that policy implementation failures were in large part attributable to the
inability of command and control structures to deal with complex tasks or to
achieve sufficient support from external actors. While some (Goetz 2008)
challenge the idea of a ‘shift’ from government to governance, other such as
Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004) suggest that the process is most
evident in the emergence of governance ‘in and by networks’. They note how
networks are viewed in the literature as pluricentric forms of governance, and
are contrasted with market (or multicentric) and hierarchical (or unicentric)
forms of governing. Public institutions now create networks of actors in their7
spheres of operation for a wide variety of purposes - from gathering
information, to collaboration and policy implementation. While network
governance is based on interdependencies, questions of democratic
legitimacy and contested views about the ‘public interest’ make it a subject of
ongoing debate. Network governance has had particular import in the
literature on welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990), and has helped to
explain divergences in patterns of redistribution. In particular, the growth of
civil society involvement in core aspects of welfare service delivery has
necessitated a reconceptualisation of state-society relationships.
The brief outline above identifies a number of commonly perceived and
prominent drivers for state fragmentation. Reading across from new
institutional approaches to regulatory institutions, however, in this paper we
propose an alternative conceptual framework for understanding government
fragmentation. Such a framework is provided by Gilardi’s (2005) work on the
factors shaping institutional changes and which distinguishes between
bottom-up, horizontal and top-down factors provides.
Bottom-up explanations work from the idea that countries face similar sorts of
problems and respond in broadly similar ways. A central feature of
government in many countries has been coping with fiscal crises (and
declines in public trust) at various times. New public management reforms
adopted in different forms have formed part of the response – seeking to
squeeze greater efficiency out of public sector bodies through the
advancement of practices such as strategic management, quality customer
service and greater understanding of the relationship between inputs and
outcomes. The elaboration of public sector audit, going beyond financial
probity to assess the value for money associated with government
programmes, can be viewed as a further aspect of this response to fiscal
difficulty.
Gilardi suggests that in addition to the ‘similar problems’ hypothesis,
institutional reforms may also represent a bottom-up attempt at addressing
political uncertainty. This argument has particular application in the world of8
regulation, because of a concern that were politicians to be left in day-to-day
charge of regulatory regimes then the risk of political changes (and thus
credible commitment) might undermine confidence of regulated businesses
and thus their willingness to invest. Does this kind of explanation have a
variant in respect of accountability regimes? There is a direct linkage between
the establishment of regulatory bodies and the fragmentation, and thus
delegation of governmental power. The shift of decision making away from
politicians might be expected to underpin a formalization of government-
industry relations as the previously unwritten norms are set down in rules and,
relatedly, an intensification of judicial scrutiny as disputes are resolved less
informally and more frequently through litigation.
Horizontal explanations for policy diffusion focus on emulation of institutional
solutions to problems faced by national governments. Gilardi highlights the
increasing interdependencies of national governments as part of the reason
for observation of learning, competition, cooperation, taken-for-grantedness
and symbolic imitation (Gilardi 2005: 90). He notes that ‘[p]olicies or
organizations become taken for granted when they are so widespread that
there is little question that they are the appropriate choice’ (Gilardi 2005: 90).
Finally, top-down explanations of diffusion are based on the idea of national
political systems responding to exogenous factors, typically requirements
deriving from international treaties or membership of international
organisations such as the OECD, the IMF or the EU.
3. Fragmentation of government: The Irish case
We consider here the Irish case, and examine the extent to which this
fragmentation is a recent phenomenon or a traditional characteristic of the
state. To provide evidence for our case, we draw on a new dataset which
maps the development of Irish public administration since independence. We
propose that the pattern of accountability changes seen in Ireland cannot
simply be explained by reference to fragmentation in government. It is part of
a wider pattern seen in many and perhaps most industrialised countries in9
which accountability structures have changed and become more complex in
response to the bottom-up, horizontal and top-down factors.
The Irish case presents some challenges for such an analysis since some of
the key elements of fragmentation can be dated to the first half of the
twentieth century and appear isolated from, rather than related to, changes
elsewhere. Nonetheless, the more recent experiences reflect developments
elsewhere in other jurisdictions and, more importantly in the context of this
paper, require us to rethink how we understand contemporary government
and accountability.
In terms of bottom-up fragmentation, the response of Irish governments to
fiscal and economic crisis during the 1980s was the establishment of a formal
corporatist arrangement known as social partnership designed to garner the
support of representative groups in the implementation of difficult policy
choices. This process, which since 1987 has resulted in triennial economic
pacts agreements between government, unions, employer organisations,
farming groups and (more recently) ‘community and voluntary groups’, has
become a major locus of power distribution. A criticism leveled against these
agreements is their lack of democratic legitimacy. While governments claim
to represent the taxpayer, there is little or no parliamentary involvement in the
decisions taken which determine in large part the activities of the
bureaucracy. Again, a case may be made that Ireland has experienced an
innovative method of governance avant la lettre. The Maastricht Treaty
introduced the concept of social dialogue into EU governance, involving
employment ministers and ‘social partners’ (unions and employers
organizations) in developing proposals which, if agreed, can be forwarded to
the Council for implementation as a Directive. Of course, other member-
states have experience of such arrangements (particularly in relation to
employment policy) but the concept of (bottom-up) ‘stakeholderism’ has a
pedigree in Ireland and has played a strong role in the institutional evolution of
the state.10
The analysis of horizontal fragmentation presented by Gilardi could underpin
the relative stability of Irish government structures following independence in
1922. The Irish administrative system is based largely on that of Whitehall,
and adheres to the values associated with this system of bureaucracy i.e.
impartiality, apolitical appointment and recruitment and promotion on merit.
For the first half century of independence after 1922, there was remarkably
little change in departmental portfolio reorganisation. However, from 1973
onwards, there is a discernible shift in the pace of portfolio reorganisation,
driven in large part by changes in electoral competition and coalition formation
between political parties. Apart from the changing portfolios, there has also
been considerable developments in respect of state agencies (below).
Adopting Gilardi’s concept of symbolic imitation – the take up of institutional
choices to bestow legitimacy on those making the decisions, as a small state
Ireland has tended to look beyond its own borders to find models for
institutional reconfiguration. The creation of new accountability institutions in
Ireland represents cases in point. The establishment of ombudsman schemes
is so widespread in Europe and beyond that the establishment of mechanisms
for providing redress for maladministration is regarded as a key part of the
accountability apparatus. Ireland was a late adopter, legislating for the
establishment of a public sector ombudsman only in 1980, but very mindful of
precedents in Scandinavia (Sweden – 1809, Denmark – 1954), New Zealand
(1962) and the United Kingdom (1969). With freedom of information
legislation, adopted in 1997, the commitment of government appears to go
beyond the symbolic, as the legislation offers a wider basis for obtaining
government information than is the case with the 1998 regime of Ireland’s
nearest neighbour, the United Kingdom. That commitment was pulled in to a
certain extent by amending legislation in 2003 which applied charges. As with
the Ombudsman legislation, the Freedom of Information legislation drew on
similar legislation elsewhere in Westminster-style democracies.
Other aspects of the Irish state administration defy comparison to a greater
extent. In part, this might be explained by the Irish state’s history of funding11
service provision by private bodies such as charities and religious
organizations. As a conservative-corporatist state, using Esping-Andersen’s
typology, Ireland provides a rather clear case of network governance in
existence long before the term came into use. The recent OECD report on
the Irish public service (OECD 2008) recognized the historical legacy of
service provision in areas such as health and education by (largely faith-
based) NGOs. It stated that ‘A networked Public Service is made up of the
many component bodies of the Public Service, but also stakeholders from
outside of the Public Service, be they users, Social Partners or civil society
organisations’ (2008: 247). It also noted how Ireland had a rich tradition of
informal networks both within government and between government and
stakeholders. In many respects Ireland represents a case of networked
government avant la lettre. Thus while the contracting out of welfare services
is regarded as a relatively new development in many states, it has been a
defining feature of Irish government since independence. In areas as diverse
as overseas aid, primary education and hospitals, NGOs have been entrusted
with considerable state authority and funding, often without corresponding
accountability and audit procedures.
The growth of agencies in Ireland is difficult to explain fully by reference to
unidimensional drivers alone. The early history of agency proliferation had a
distinctive Irish approach to such issues as development and censorship, both
of which were regarded as core governmental functions, but to be carried out
at arms-length from ministers. In the absence of a robust administrative law
tradition, non-commercial (and commercial) agencies emerged in a largely ad
hoc manner and with a wide variety of reporting and accountability
relationships to their parent departments. The Irish state administration
database provides us with detailed information of the growth of state
agencies. Unlike many other jurisdictions, where the process of
agencification has occurred in ‘waves’, in Ireland the process has been one of
gradual acceleration which has peaked only recently as Figure 1 depicting the
1958-08 period demonstrates. The recent acceleration in the growth of
agencies may be attributed to a certain ‘taken for grantedness’ that agencies
provide a central solution to a wide range of policy problems.12
Figure 1: Number of state agencies in existence in Ireland
The growth of the Irish regulatory state has been particularly prominent, and
like the agencification process outlined above, characterised by a rapid
increase in the number of regulatory bodies within the last two decades.13
Figure 2: Number of regulatory bodies in Ireland
Ireland also has a legacy in relation to the delegation of regulatory functions to
private bodies overseeing professions such as solicitors and medical doctors.
The threat of statutory regulation resulted in the creation of new regulatory
bodies (e.g. the Advertising Standards Authority of Ireland (1977) and most
recently the Press Council (2007)) by the affected industries.
In respect of changes in public administration generally, Ireland was a less
enthusiastic implementer of new public management reforms than many other
countries. For example, there has been limited and weak application of new
doctrines concerning separation of operational and policy making tasks, which
underpin both the growth of executive agencies and policies of privatization in
many countries. This is surprising given that the public service reform
programme adopted in the mid-1990s was based on the relatively radical and
substantive New Zealand reform experience. Despite a programme of reform
designed to enhance public service efficiency, a recent OECD report was
critical of the largely ad hoc growth in different forms of structure and policy
style which emerged and had played a role in contributing to confused
accountability relationships (OECD 2008).14
In relation to top-down drivers of fragmentation, in an Irish context we can
identify such factors as bilateral agreements like the Good Friday Agreement
which brought with it a common commitment between the UK and Ireland to
the institutionalization of domestic accountability for breaches of human rights
and in Ireland the establishment of the Irish Human Rights Commission in
2000. The impact of membership of the European Union, a key factor in
explaining growth in regulatory agencies, has been rather less in respect of
accountability structures. The main impact lies in adapting domestic financial
accountability to EU requirements for scrutiny of expenditure of EU funds at
national level, and the potential for scrutiny from EU institutions, including the
European Commission and the European Court of Auditors. Amongst
Ireland’s other international activities, membership of the OECD has been a
central factor in the establishment of domestic scrutiny over rule making within
the better regulation regime administered by the Department of the
Taioseach.
4. Accountability in the fragmented state
Conventional democracy has been characterised as a process of steering
and accountability through political institutions (Pierre 2009: 3). As the
fragmentation outlined above recasts issues concerning the exercise of
political power, it follows that there are challenges for the practice of
accountability. As with new modes of governance, this difficulty has been the
subject of much discussion in recent years. Accountability has emerged as a
watchword of the modern era, but what does it encapsulate?
An influential House of Lords report on the accountability of regulators
proposed that accountability is ‘a generic term, the precise definition of which
depends on the circumstances’ (2004: para. 48), but identifies and explores
three elements – the duty to explain, exposure to scrutiny and the possibility
of independent review (para. 9). Bovens (2007) neatly defines it as ‘a
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose15
questions and pass judgements, and the actor may face consequences’. In
so doing he distinguishes between ‘broad’ interpretations of accountability
(e.g. accountability as responsiveness), which make it an evaluative concept;
and ‘narrow’ conceptions which detail the process of account giving. In
general, he finds accountability is a retrospective process, but accepts that it
can be preventative and is closely linked to debates about participation.
Building on work by Dubnick, Behn (2001) distinguishes between account-
holders and holdees and argues that ‘when we talk about holding people
accountable, we usually mean accountability for one of three things:
accountability for finances, accountability for fairness, or accountability for
performance’. Behn suggests that doctrines of modern public administration
– that administration should be separated from government, that of the
various methods and implements in the science of administration, there is one
that is best, and that bureaucracy was best way to support the scientific
application of the principles of administration – were central to the formulation
of traditional conceptions of accountability. The weakening of these doctrines
raises important questions concerning the appropriateness of accountability
structures.
For Mulgan (2003), accountability is not just ‘calling’ to account, it also
involves being ‘held’ to account, therefore implying some form of rectification
via remedies or sanction. He identifies two justifications for the pursuit of
accountability:
1) Rights of prior authority or ownership i.e. as an agent delegates power or
authority, he or she has right to call to account
2) The principle that those whose rights are adversely affected by the actions
of someone else have a right to hold someone to account for the manner in
which they have been treated
He also recognises the emergence of multiple accountability relationships in
recent years, particularly under the guise of New Public Management, and
the dilemmas posed by this for contemporary governments.16
As well as these definitional issues, however, as with the expansion in
literature on governance (e.g. network, reflexive), the identification of different
functional accountability forms have become common. Recognition that
multiple accountability relationships co-exist and can therefore conflict began
to gather pace in the 1980s, best exemplified by Romzek and Dubnick‘s
(1987) seminal work on the Challenger tragedy. Since then, a growing
number of scholars and works have used variations on a ‘multiple
accountabilities’ framework to explain administrative failures, political
inadequacies and deviations from normative conceptions of contemporary
governance.
Fragmented accountability structures in Ireland
The dominant model of accountability in post-independence Ireland was built
around ministerial responsibility to the legislature, the Comptroller and Auditor
General, and the courts. However, as in other jurisdictions, there has been a
recent tendency to supplement traditional forms of executive oversight with
quasi-judicial and other mechanisms for ex-post accountability (Hood et al
1999). As Table 1 below details, in an Irish context, traditional accountability
mechanisms, though remaining central to the accountability framework, have
been supplemented by others (shaded) including new parliamentary
committee systems, quasi-judicial inquiries and a range of what may be
referred to as non-majoritarian institutions (Majone 1994). In Majone’s
formulation, such institutions have come to fill a void that has emerged
between citizens and politicians; and replaced by reliance on ‘functional’
representation to protect the public interest. Into this category are included an
increasing number of regulators and independent oversight bodies such as
the various Ombudsman offices.

































































*Adapted from MacCarthaigh (2005)
A feature of Gilardi’s bottom-up explanation of fragmentation is that increased
formalisation of norms and the related intensification in judicial scrutiny will
enhance the status of judicial review as a form of accountability. Whilst
judicial review is not a new feature of the Irish accountability scene, it has18
seen remarkable growth in usage, and thus in its relative importance within
the accountability structures has increased.
While Table 1 presents an overview of the principal accountability
relationships between the bureaucracy and the public (via representative
institutions), data from the Mapping the State database demonstrates even
greater complexity within the use of such non-majoritarian institutions. We
find that accountability is diverse, expanding, and, most fundamentally, has
mixed application.
Considering the proliferation of accountability mechanisms applying to the
Irish central state bodies, as before we can also conceive of the forces
shaping them as comprising bottom-up, horizontal and top-down. The top-
down pressures are defined as those where government or legislature has
been required to implement new accountability structures, for example
because of Treaty obligations. Key examples include the incorporation of the
European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law. Various
mechanisms for oversight of EU funding, both domestic and at European
level, derive from obligations associated with membership of the EU, as does
the broader accountability of government and legislature for obedience to the
requirements of the Treaties. Thus there is a process of Europeanization.
Horizontally, driver reforms involve elements of policy learning from the
experience of other jurisdictions. Contemporary practices in benchmarking
between national governments have an element of this and are exemplified
by Ireland’s participation in the OECD. The establishment of the machinery of
Better Regulation as a mechanism of oversight over government rule making
emerged in this way. Whilst the Comptroller and Auditor General is an
ancient office, the extension of the office’s remit to include value for money
reports is an adaptation that has bee made in many jurisdictions. Also, the
recently established Standards in Public Office Commission seeks to provide
for greater financial scrutiny of politicians, political parties and elections.19
Bottom-up reforms designed to provide greater accountability are conceived
as responses to policy problems, often common with other jurisdictions, but
where the response is distinctive, shaped by particular institutional
configurations. For example, the considerable dependence placed in Ireland
on the establishment of ad hoc tribunals of inquiry to investigate matters of
political corruption compares unfavourably with the establishment of standing
anti-corruptions bodies in the Hong Kong and a number of the Australian
states.
It is also possible to have a number of accountability ‘intensities’, ranging from
‘full’ to peripheral, shown in figure 3 below. While core institutions of state
such as government departments are subject to full accountability, many non-
departmental bodies are not subject to the same extent. Instead, they may be
indirectly audited by a government body (other than the Comptroller and
Auditor-General) or a private body. Similarly, there are bodies at a further
remove from mid-range accountability and which, while their may be
subjected to judicial review, are partially covered by the FOI and Ombudsman
Acts.20
Figure 3 Intensity of accountability
In their analysis of Irish agencies, Clancy and Murphy also note the
incomplete and confusing application of accountability mechanisms (such as
those mentioned above) to the range of public entities. Using our database,
and considering the number of state agencies which are subject to the
Freedom of Information Act as of 2008, as Figure 4 identifies we similarly find







Full = Parliamentary, Audit, Judicial, Ombudsman and FOI
Mid-Range = Parliamentary, Judicial, FOI and or Ombudsman
Peripheral = Ombudsman and/or FOI and/or Judicial21
Figure 4: Freedom on Information coverage
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the related case of the various Ombudsmans offices.
Of the agencies in our database, only one-quarter of the them will be covered
by the stipulations of a new Ombudsman Bill due to become law in 2009,
while an even smaller portion are covered by sectoral Ombudsman’s offices,
such as the Ombudsman for Children.
Figure 5: Coverage of the Public Service Ombudsman22
Figure 6: Coverage of the Ombudsman for Children
Similarly, as Figure 7 below shows, the direct accountability of state agencies
to the Comptroller and Auditor-General is incomplete. While many bodies are
indirectly audited by the office, via the accounts of their parent departments,
Clancy and Murphy also find the scope of the office to be incomplete.
Figure 7: Coverage of Comptroller and Auditor General23
Thus, both new and old mechanisms of government accountability have
mixed application across the breadth of government. In the absence of
coherent or incomplete accountability frameworks, it is conceivable that new
patchwork accountability mechanisms will continue to emerge, further
increase the complexity of our conceptual map of the governing process.
Also, for those bodies subject to multiple accountability requirements,
tradeoffs in terms of efficiency and performance will continue to present
challanges.
5. Conclusion: Challenges of fragmented accountability in the
fragmented state
As demonstrated above, the case of Irish government provides a fragmented
picture – partly explained by broader international trends, and partly
illustrating the distinctiveness of the Irish case. Beneath this system of
government lies an equally fragmented accountability framework that in many
cases fails to follow the contours of the government system and which thus
presents problems of coherence. The supplementing of political, financial and
juridical accountability structures with a myriad of new oversight relationships
has create a network of considerable density which is not easily
conceptualized. We propose that Ireland is not alone in this problem of
fragmentation, and bottom-up, horizontal and top-down pressures will
continue to be met with a variety of institutional responses that challenge core
public institutions of accountability.
Thus we need to reconceptualise accountability as it is not feasible to apply a
single model of classical public sector accountability (based in political,
financial and judicial oversight) to all state actors in such fragmented systems.
Accordingly it is inevitable that there will be a mixed model with the kind of
variable intensity which we have observed. A key point here is that some of
the organizations which appear peripheral on the public accountability model
may have other forms of accountability acting as compensation. For example
companies have responsibilities to shareholders and directors, and in some24
cases to the market. Faith groups have accountability structures which are
both organizational and community-based in character. This is not to say that
the arrangements existing for any and all organizations are optimal, but rather
to argue that the broader accountability regime for any organization should be
considered in evaluating the appropriateness of current accountability
arrangements. From such an analysis it might be possible to intensify the
more effective or appropriate aspects of accountability and/or to inhibit those
elements which are ineffective or counter-productive. Such an analysis will
often require us to look outside the formal accountability arrangements to
include consideration of the interdependencies of organizations within
networks and the potential for non-mandated organizations such as the media
and NGOs to hold others to account.
As increasingly complex frameworks emerge to explain the institutional
development of the modern state, there is a tendency to overlook the
essential role of established institutions which shape the political and
administrative agenda. A relentless pursuit for ever greater accountability is
not without cost, and more efficient ways of ensuring that agents are
performing as principals desire are constantly sought. Also, issues of trust and
democratic legitimacy must also be factored into any discussion of new
modes of accountable governance.25
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